In this paper we empirically analyse two counterfactual situations facing an antitrust authority following the merger of two of the largest international cigarette companies. First we estimate a random coecients model of demand for cigarettes. The implied elasticity of demand for smoking and implied marginal costs are consistent with the independent estimates available. We then use the model to simulate the proposed merger and the partial divestiture that was accepted by the Australian antitrust authority. A comparison of the relative price changes predicted by the divestiture simulation with the actual post-divestiture price changes shows that the model is partially successful in predicting the ranking of price changes across companies following the divestiture. This suggests structural econometric analysis using a random coecients model can provide information for antitrust authorities assessing the implications of a potential merger and partial divestiture.
Introduction
In 1999 a merger took place internationally between two of the largest cigarette companies in the world, British American Tobacco and Rothmans International. Antitrust authorities around the world responded to this merger, within a few months, by imposing partial divestiture regimes on the local subsidiaries. In doing so, antitrust authorities would have considered various counterfactual scenarios in assessing the competition eects on the economy. While economic theory can provide insight into understanding the competitive impact of a merger, it typically cannot provide more detailed guidance on the types of brands that should be divested and how brand mix can preserve the pre-merger extent of competition. This raises the issue as to whether structural econometric models can improve on more informal analyses of the dierent counterfactuals in order to provide greater guidance in constructing divestiture agreements.
In this paper we assess the performance of the random coecients logit model by predicting price movements following a merger and divestiture in 1999 in the Australian cigarette market.
The random coecient logit model is used as it is the main dierentiated products demand model used for estimating demand (Ackerberg et al, 2007) , including for cigarettes (Ciliberto and Kumino, 2010) . There are now several assessments of its performance in merger simulation, such as Peters (2006) and Weinberg and Hosken (forthcoming) but despite divestitures being a common tool of competition of competition authorities, Friberg and Romahn (2012) is the only other study assessing its performance in simulating divestitures.
1 Our data is compiled from documents made public as a result of landmark litigation against the U.S. cigarette industry. It includes all signicant brand and pack size combinations oered by the three large rms across each of the six capital cities of the states of Australia from 1986 to 1992. We analyse two counterfactual scenarios associated with the 1999 merger. In the rst scenario, we estimate the impact of the merger which results in the number of rms falling from three to two. In the second scenario, we assess the partial divestiture accepted by the Australian antitrust authority, the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), where the brands were divided between the merged rm and a new rm, Imperial Tobacco Australia (ITA) . We compare the ranking of the price changes across companies predicted by the model against what actually happened following the divestiture.
We nd that the model provides fresh insight on the pattern of substitutability and direction of changes in the post-divestiture equilibrium. The model successfully predicts that there would be relatively small price changes by ITA and Philip Morris following the divestiture. With respect to predicted price movements for brands held by BATA, the post-merger rm, the model is able to predict relative price changes. However, the magnitude of these changes tends to be too large, over-estimating merger eects. Our results are signicant for two main reasons. First, we provide one of the rst pieces of evidence that a random coecients logit model can provide potentially useful predictions of the outcomes of divestitures, even under fairly demanding conditions. Second, it provides an example of how an accessible modelling approach can be used to provide information for antitrust authorities who have little time to empirically assess competition issues around specic mergers.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section details the background of the cigarette industry and describes the merger. Section three reviews the random coecients logit model we use for estimation. Section four describes the data used in estimation and section ve discusses results and interpretation. Section six presents the results of our simulations and the validation exercise and section seven summarises our conclusions.
The Australian cigarette industry
During our observation period, 1986 to 1992, Rothmans Holdings Ltd (hereafter referred to as Rothmans), WD & HO Wills Holdings Ltd (owned by British American Tobacco) (hereafter referred to as Wills) and Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd, each supplied, on average, about a third of the Australian cigarette market. RJ Reynolds operated for just part of the period on a very small scale before distribution of its brands was taken over by Rothmans. Like many developed economies, the market for cigarettes in Australia has been steadily declining since the 1970's. In 1974 about 36% of Australian adults smoked and by 1992 this percentage had declined to about 25% (Hill and White, 1995) . While the discovery of the negative health eects of smoking was a fundamental cause of the decline, it has been estimated that demographic and income changes, government policies on taxation and regulation of advertising and consumption also contributed to the continuing decline in demand in Australia.
2 In this paper we focus on the developments in the cigarette industry between 1986 and 1992.
Government intervention in the cigarette market
Federal and state governments have intervened in four ways to discourage cigarette smoking.
First, taxes have been increased signicantly as demonstrated in Table 1 . Between 1986 and 1992 the Federal weight-based tobacco excise remained constant but state level ad valorem taxes on cigarettes were substantially increased. In 1986 most states had tax rates of between 25 and 35 per cent, and by 1992 all states except Queensland had tax rates of 50 per cent. The tax increases occurred at dierent times in dierent states, with Tasmania the rst to increase its tax rate to 50 per cent in 1988.
Second, the government introduced regulations on advertising, including general marketing practices. Direct advertising on television and radio had been previously phased out in 1976, and further regulation prohibited advertising in print media, broadcast media, billboards, cinema, sporting events and sponsorships, or any other outdoor signs. This was complemented by campaigns against smoking by government and non-governmental organizations. Third, from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, smoking in workplaces and public places was increasingly restricted (Winstanley et al, 1995) .
Fourth, the cigarette industry was specically monitored by a series of prices surveillance agencies between 1973 and 1996. From 1984 cigarette prices were monitored by the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA).
3 Price monitoring ultimately ceased in 1996, following evidence cited by the ACCC of increasing competitive behaviour in the cigarette industry (ACCC, 1996) . 4
Cigarette industry responses to tax increases
The cigarette companies responded to the increases in tobacco and cigarette taxation by moving toward the`value' or`discount' segment of the market. The discount segment was created in the mid-1970s by initially extending already successful brands from standard size packs of 20 sticks to 25 sticks. At the time it was considered a less risky marketing strategy than undertaking costly launches of new brands, particularly given the greater restrictions on advertising. This proved to be successful and larger packs of 30, 40 and 50 sticks per pack were introduced. The larger packs featured lower per-stick prices, which appealed to the lower socio-economic classes who were a sizeable proportion of smoker demographics (Hill and White, 1995) .
As a result, the market share of the 20s segment fell from 47% in 1980 to 4% in 1991 (Beriot, 1993) . By 1992, 30s, 35s, 40s and 50s made up 16%, 11%, 14% and 17% of sales respectively (Beriot, 1993) . Winstanley et al (1995) argues that this was also a tactic to entice new smokers who may have been worried about the long term expenses of a cigarette habit. Prot margins were to some extent preserved because the large pack cigarettes had lower marginal costs. Winstanley et al (1995) report that discount brands were around ten per cent lighter per stick than other brands and this meant lower input costs and lower federal excise per stick. In addition, lower per-stick prices meant lower state government taxes. Winstanley et al (1995) calculated that tax was approximately 20% lower on the discount brands than other brands. We will refer to brands with maximum pack sizes of between 20 and 25 as mainstream brands and brands with maximum pack sizes of more than 25 as discount brands.
Eight of the largest brands are listed in Table 2 along their median, minimum and maximum market shares across each of the six major urban markets in Australia in 1992. In nearly all markets, these brand-size combinations made up more than 75% of sales by volume. Table 2 shows Rothmans and Wills had the brands with the largest market shares for mainstream brands and for pack sizes of 50 cigarettes whereas Philip Morris had most of the large brands for pack sizes between 30 and 40. Even seven years later in 1999, when we perform our merger simulations, data from various sources suggest that there had been no major changes in the roles of the major brands.
2. are limited in the way they can systematically handle relationships between products sold by the same rm and by competitors, and often are unable to generate strong evidence on the equilibrium eects on prices and consumer surplus. Merger simulations using dierentiated product oligopoly models can be used to generate information relating to both of these issues. The demand elasiticities and other parameters required for these models can be estimated from dierentiated products demand models ranginig from the relative simple and highly aggregated linear and AIDS models, to the more complex logit-based models (Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2009 ). These models exhibit varying degrees of exibility in terms of accommodating cross brand substitutability within and across rms. The most exible of these demand models is the random coecients logit model (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995) . This model can handle highly disaggregated brand varieties and markets, and the results from estimating this model can be used in simulating the market under dierent assumptions about brand ownership (Nevo, 2000) .
Demand for Cigarettes
In this section we present a standard discrete choice model of the demand for cigarettes where the unit is one cigarette stick. While consumers consume multiple cigarettes and typically purchase multiple packets of cigarettes per period, choices of cigarette brands are discrete in the sense that even when the consumer can aord more than one option people typically use only one brand at a time (Anderson et al, 1992) . Though the correlation between error terms implied by consuming multiple units of the same product is not explicitly modelled, experience estimating random coecients models with actual data (Nevo, 2000) and nested logit models with simulated data (Huang et al, 2008) suggest that satisfactory results can be obtained by analysing such products with discrete brand choices.
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One potential complication in modelling cigarette demand is that the addictive nature of cigarettes makes the decision to smoke a dynamic problem for the consumer. However, this is greater signicance for smoking in general, than for smoking particular brands. Ciliberto and Kumino (2010) The second random coecient,β 0i , is given by:
where β 0 is the mean parameter, z i an identically and independently distributed standard normal variable diering across individuals and σ con the associated parameter. To deal with any unobserved eects that are constant over time across brands and across cities, we include vectors of cities and brand dummy variables i.e. city and brand. In addition, to control for any unobserved correlation over time due to, for example, the diusion of knowledge about the health consequences of smoking, we also include a time trend. The nal specication of the utility function is:
u ijs = β 0 +x js β−αp js +β size size+trendβ trend +cityβ city +brandβ brand +σ con z i +σ price y is p js +∆ξ js + ij
where ∆ξ js is the unobserved characteristics after removing brand, trend and city eects. Denote the mean utility, δ j , as:
Each consumer makes the choice of brands, size and not smoking, that maximises their utility. We discuss these choices further in Section 4.2. The set of consumers that makes choice j is denoted A j and the market share of choice j is given by:
Because of the random coecients, a closed form expression for s j does not exist. In addition, because we are analyzing an oligopoly p is endogenous. Hence, simulated method of moments is used to estimate the parameters of the model. 10 Because a relatively small (and declining) proportion of the population smokes, we use importance sampling to reduce the variance resulting from simulation. The densities in equations 6 and 7 should be interpreted accordingly.
As well as the estimates of the coecients we also report a selection of own and cross price elasticities. The formulae for these are:
3.2 Supply side of Cigarette Market
In this section we present the assumptions required for performing the merger simulations. First, for the six rms that operate in the Australian market between 1974 and 2000, denote F f as the set of the j = 1 , . . . , J brands owned by the f th rm where f = 1, . . . , 6. We suppress the state and time subscripts for clarity. The prot of the f th rm is:
where mc j is the marginal cost of product j, C f is the xed cost of production, and M is the size of the market. The equilibrium concept assumed for the oligopoly game is Bertrand-Nash in prices.
11 Denote Ω pre jr as follows:
Note the elements of this matrix depends on the assignment of brands to rms. We can then write the rst order conditions, in vector notation, to be satised in equilibrium as:
This can be rearranged to solve for mc:
With estimates of the parameters and the data we can obtain estimates of marginal cost. Denote Ω post as the post-merger equivalent of Ω pre . We can solve for the post-merger price as the solution to:
The ownership matrix will vary depending on whether the merger proceeds with or without an enforced divestiture. 12 Data on cigarettes sold by importers was not available but the share of importers in the Australian cigarette market is negligible. Although there is no substantial change in the market shares across the two sets of reports, there is a change in denition in 1990 which appears to have aected some quantities. We explain how this is handled in Appendix A.
Data
Prices were collected from the June editions of the trade journal, Australian Retail Tobacconist (hereafter referred to as ART), and adjusted for ination using the state CPIs. 13 We use the June price as variation in prices between months is relatively low. The ART includes tax inclusive recommended retail and wholesale prices for cigarettes per pack by brand. The ART list of brands and varieties is more comprehensive than the list of those reported in the Neilsen market share data as it includes imported brands not in the Nielsen data. The small minority of cases, for brands included in the Neilsen data, where prices diered across varieties of the same size or where the varieties did not correspond well across the reports are discussed in more detail in Appendix A. We do not expect these cases to have a signicant impact on our results. Table 3 reports there are 1591 observations in total in the dataset. To demonstrate the variation and sources of identication we report statistics for 1986, 1989 and 1992 . In the rst row we note that the number of observations increased over time. This is in part due to more varieties being oered and more detailed reporting in 1991 and 1992. Lines two and three give a more accurate sense of the increase in varieties by using the numbers reported in the ART (including those not included in the Nielsen data). This demonstrates that the number of varieties has increased by a third even though the number of brands has fallen by just under 10%. It is worth noting at this point that it tends to be the brands with the largest market shares that feature the most varieties.
Lines three to six of Table 3 report average real prices per stick in the sample by packet sizes.
For now we just note that real prices within each pack size group are tending to increase, consistent with the increase in retail taxes highlighted earlier, with the largest increases occurring between 1989 and 1992.
Market share of the outside alternative
The outside good is assumed to be not smoking domestic factory made cigarettes. As data is reported on a bimonthly basis, the market size for a city is calculated as the population of the city multiplied by the number of opportunities to smoke over the two month period. Results of the 1989 and 1992 surveys presented in Hill et al (1991) and Hill and White (1995) demonstrate that on average smokers smoke about 20 cigarettes a day so we assume 25 smoking opportunities per day as a conservative measure. However, to check our results were not determined by this choice for the outside good, we repeated all estimation with an assumption of 20 smoking opportunities and found it made almost no dierence to the results.
As we observe the quantity of domestic factory cigarettes sold in each market, we calculate the market share of smoking as the ratio of cigarettes smoked to the market size. The market share for the outside good is therefore one less the market share of smoking. While the share of outside good eectively includes consumption of other tobacco related products such as smokeless tobacco, cigars, pipes, imported cigarettes, roll-your-own cigarettes and illegal cigarettes (chopchop, counterfeit and contraband), in Australia most of these have very small market shares. 14 Lines 7 and 8 of Table 3 report the average market shares and the share of the outside alternative for selected years in the data period.
We note that for the period of 1986 to 1990 there is a small dierence between the sum of the market shares in the sample and the market share of smoking. This is likely due to the omission in the Nielsen reports of a number of very small brands. These missing brands have not been included in the calculation of the outside good as we were able to identify all parameters of the model except for those on the dummy variables associated with the missing brands. We do not believe that these brands would have a signicant eect on the demand for and pricing of brands we are estimating as the excluded brands were likely to be unavailable from many retail outlets.
Other explanatory variables
We follow Nevo (2001) and include brand dummy variables to control for brand specic characteristics that are constant over time. For example, some brands were launched when electronic advertising was legal and could build up brand-specic capital before further advertising was prohibited. As discussed earlier we include dummy variables for pack sizes with the control group being 20. As lines 3 to 6 of Table 3 show that larger packs tend to have lower per-stick prices. Even though cigarette sticks in larger packs tend to have less tobacco, this suggests rms were quantity
increasing pack sizes as a competitive move rather than in terms of dierentiating their product.
Lines 11 to 13 of Table 3 highlight how the major cigarette companies introduced more and more large pack cigarettes and lines 14 to 16 demonstrate how some large brand cigarettes gained a large market share. However, we cannot include a dummy for 50-stick packs as the coecient on this cannot be separately identied from brand dummies.
We also control for the change in the mix of types of cigarettes sold between 1986 and 1992.
Over this period the three major cigarette companies introduced new types, including for existing brands, described by a similar set of terms which translate into a rough ordering of mildness in taste e.g Extra Mild, Ultra Mild and Ultimate. Because our unit of observation is brandpack size, which can include dierent types, we cannot include dummies by type but instead use dummy variables associated with the mildest type of cigarette available for that brand. In lines 9 and 10 of table 3 we see the share of observations including an ultra mild (or milder) variety increased substantially over the period. It is likely that this dummy is correlated with promotional expenditures if the companies tended to promote new varieties more than existing ones. There is no dummy for menthol cigarettes in the main these could not be identied separated from brand dummies. We also included city dummies (with Sydney being the excluded city) and the number of types of cigarettes for each brand-size combination to control for dierent varieties being available for dierent brands.
Instruments
With city eects, brand eects and a time trend, the error term is the unobserved deviation from the overall mean valuation of the brand. Since rms observe and account for this deviation, it will be correlated with prices and therefore least squares estimates will be inconsistent. We use two sets of instruments to address this issue. The rst draws on cigarette tax rates that vary by city over time. As described in section 2 the changes in taxes are substantial. Furthermore, taxes are a signicant component of the price of a cigarette. Specically, in 1993, for a 30-cigarette pack in the state of New South Wales (NSW) Figure 1 demonstrates that 23.1% of the price goes to the manufacturer, 16.5% goes to the retailer, 35.8% covers state tax and 24.6% covers federal excise.
An important advantage of using taxes as an instrument is that the eect on prices from taxes will be similar to that of a merger, in that such eects are permanent (as opposed to using exogenous temporary variation such as weather driven tobacco shortages). Because both changes are likely to be permanent, consumers are likely to respond in similar ways. As prices across brands tend to vary systematically with pack size, we combine the tax rates with pack-size dummies to generate the instruments.
The second source of instruments are variations on the BLP instruments. We include the number of other brands in the same pack-size oered by the same rm and by other rms and their squares, as instrumental variables. All values are calculated for the relevant city. The averages are reported in the last two lines of Table 3 .
5 Results
OLS and IV estimates
To illustrate correlations in the data and the roles played by the instruments, in Table 4 we present OLS and IV estimates of a logit model. The main dierence between these two sets of results is that the OLS estimate of the coecient on price is statistically insignicant whereas the IV estimate is larger and statistically signicantly dierent from zero at 10%. In all other cases, the estimates are similar and this is likely due to the fact that across cities, the large tax changes are primarily generating the changes in price.
The importance of the tax changes in determining price changes is suggested by the results of the rst stage regression for the IV logit reported in the second column of Table 4 . Almost 98% of the variation is explained by the exogeneous variables and instruments. The coecients on the instrumental variables constructed by interacting tax rates with pack-size dummies shows that the eect on price tends to be greater for the mainstream brands and smaller for the discount brands.
The coecients on the pack-size dummies show there is signicant quantity discounting compared with 20-stick brands. As discussed earlier, we cannot separately identify a pack-size dummy for 50-stick brands so we instead report the average brand dummy for these brands.
The coecients on the BLP-style instruments, namely the number of brands and number of brands squared, are all statistically signicant and suggest a hump-shaped relationship with price.
The turning points of the humps are at 21 for brands of the same size oered by the same rm, and 56 for brands of the same size oered by other rms. Nearly all of the cases to the right of the turning points, for which there is a negative relationship with price, are the 20-stick mainstream brands almost exclusively introduced well before the bans on advertising. Consistent with the argument of Ackerberg and Rysman (2005) , these brands experience crowding, lower demand and lower prices. The recently introduced, relatively few, discount brands on the right of the turning points, for which there is a positive relationship with price, seem to become more attractive to consumers, even as their numbers increased. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) provide an example of this sort of phenomena in an entry environment where locations with one rm were more likely to attract others.
At this stage we note that there is a negative relationship between price and the mildest variety dummies. This is not expected as these diused during the sample period and were supposed to be responses to consumer desires for lighter cigarettes. The negative relationship could result from two phenomenon. First, the introduction of these products is a response to declining demand for cigarettes and so rather than controlling for the attractiveness of cigarettes, they are actually controlling for a non-linear negative trend in demand. Furthermore, the extra varieties, particularly extra and ultra mild were frequently introduced for existing brands that were experiencing heavy competition from the discount brands and so again control for non-linear eects on demand over time. Table 5 reports the results from estimating a random coecients logit model. Standard errors are compiled using the same approach as BLP allowing for within-brand correlation over time and heteroskedasticity across brands. The coecients on the non-price variables are similar in both size and sign to those from the IV logit. With a dierent functional form the coecient on price is much larger and there is a signicant positive coecient on the interaction terms with income, which supports the use of the random coecients logit model. The sign and size of each of these coecients is as required for a valid demand model.
Random coecients logit estimates
The coecients on the size dummies have the expected size and signicance. The short-lived 15-stick packs have a negative coecient whereas the discount brands which became more popular over the period have signicant positive coecients. This suggests that it wasn't only a simple price eect that made these packs more attractive. However, the dummies of the degree of the mildest type for each brand-pack size variety are mostly signicantly negative. This also occurred in the reduced form and (for prices) in the rst stage results. The introduction of these varieties are eectively acting as another control for lower demand over time rather than greater attractiveness of these types. Beyond this the time trend is both negative and signicant, capturing a common decline in demand for cigarettes over this period beyond the eect of increased prices. Table 6 summarises the estimates of the own and cross-price elasticities for the largest brand-size combinations in 1992. There is some variation across the six cities (not reported in Table 6 ).
Demand elasticities
Sydney features the most inelastic demand for cigarettes, with all of the own-price elasticities for the large brands falling between -1.15 and -1.81. Hobart features the most elastic demand with elasticities between -2.08 and -3.31. This in part reects that incomes on average are higher in Sydney and these elasticities are consistent with the assessment of the price sensitivities reported in Philip Morris (1990) , in which Philip Morris described Adelaide, Brisbane, Hobart and Perth to be the more price conscious markets in comparison with Melbourne and Sydney. Given the variation, we focus on the median elasticity across the markets.
The common pattern across cities is that the demand for the discount brands is relatively more inelastic than for mainstream brands. The median elasticity for 1992 for Longbeach is -1.83 whereas the median elasticity for the three large mainstream brands is between -2.35 and -2.69. This appears to go against the intuition that greater dierentiation should translate into a less price-elastic demand. In general, mainstream brands were launched when advertising was less restricted and companies had greater opportunities to dierentiate their products by advertising. 15
In addition, Tauras, Peck and Chaloupka (2006) found market shares for discount and deep discount cigarettes are three or more times as responsive to own price changes than the mainstream market shares.
While these results may be partially driven by the functional form assumptions reected in equation 7, the random coecients logit does permit osetting inuences through the integrals.
There are both theoretical reasons and evidence from company marketing documents that may explain these seemingly unintuitive results. First, the famous`Cellophane fallacy' highlights how rms will take advantage of dierentiation in their pricing (though it doesn't automatically imply the demand for more dierentiated products will be more elastic).
Second, company marketing documents suggest that mainstream brands were marketed to attract new consumers. With greater restrictions on advertising during the data period, it appears that companies chose to extract further value from the goodwill built from these brands in order to attract new customers. For example, Wills' marketing strategy for Benson & Hedges was to increase the appeal of the brand to 25-35 year old`YAUS' (young adult urban smokers) (WD & HO Wills (Australia) Limited, 1992) . Such agship brands may attract new smokers who believe they will not be addicted to cigarettes. These consumers are known as`chippers' and are dened as smokers who consume less than ve cigarettes a day (Shiman, 1989) . Hence, image and taste, rather than price was a determining factor in initial cigarette choice. These consumers may have relatively elastic demands because if the price of a particular brand of mainstream cigarettes becomes too high, they will opt not to smoke or smoke an alternative mainstream brand. Upon addiction, price plays an increasingly important factor in cigarette choice and addicted consumers begin consuming discount brands. This approach was taken by Wills, who in an internal company document acknowledged that the over 40 age group were more price conscious than the under 40's, with the under 30's franchise being key target market prospects for high priced image brands (WD & HO Wills (Australia) Limited, undated). Thus, the relative inelasticity of discount brands may be reective of higher degrees of addictiveness among their consumers. Table 6 also reports the cross price elasticities for the largest brands. The cross-price elasticities are quite substantial. The smallest eects come from changes in the price of Alpine, which has the smallest sales of the large brands and is primarily a menthol cigarette brand. This is consistent with smoker behaviour in that smokers of non-menthol cigarettes do not nd menthol cigarettes to be close substitutes (Tauras et al, 2010) . While the cross-price elasticities are driven to some extent by sizes, the general pattern is quite plausible. The cross price elasticity associated with changes in prices for the mainstream brands tends to be lower than that associated with the discount brands.
Before proceeding it is worthwhile briey comparing the results to those of Pham and Prentice (2010) who estimated a nested logit demand model using more aggregated brand level data for cigarettes in Australia over a longer period. In general the results are broadly similar though the estimates from the random coecient logit model tend to be a bit less elastic. However, the same pattern of more inelastic demand for discount brands relative to mainstream brands was also found for the nested logit model. Not surprisingly the random coecient logit permits a more diverse pattern of cross-price elasticities.
Eect of a change in price on smoking
By dening the outside good as not smoking, our model can be used to generate estimates of the elasticity of cigarette demand with respect to price which can be compared with earlier estimates.
Denote the share of cigarette smoking as s s,t with t = b, a where b is before the price change and a is after. We increase the prices of all cigarettes by 1% and calculate the elasticity of demand as follows:
The estimated elasticity of demand for cigarettes range from a maximum of -0.4 for Sydney to a minimum of -0.26 for Brisbane. The median elasticity is -0.33. This is a bit lower than the own-price elasticities of demand for cigarettes estimated using other data. For example, Scollo et al (2003) cite research that states a typical estimate for Australia is -0.4. This is ultimately based on research reviewed in Industry Commission (1994) for which the most recent estimates ranged between -0.34 to -0.47. Our data is likely to be more recent than at least some of the studies reviewed here and possibly those consumers left after the recent tax increases tend to have less elastic demand. However, our estimates are certainly similar to those that are available.
Marginal costs and markups
In order to simulate mergers and divestitures, we generate estimates of marginal costs using the results of the random coecients logit model. Before doing so, we rst report in the second column of Table 7 , a set of estimates calculated from an alternative source for the largest brandsize combinations in 1992. Specically, they are calculated combining some brand specic tax wholesale prices and tax rates from the Australian Retail Tobacconist. The wholesale prices are broken down into variable costs and margins using an estimate of a typical decomposition in PSA (1994) (as discussed in more detail in Appendix B). These estimates are between about 3.4 and The remaining columns of Table 7 report the marginal costs calculated using the results of the random coecients logit model, as described in section 3.2., assuming a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. The median estimate is typically about one cent from the calculated estimate in the second column with the marginal cost being over-estimated for the premium, small-pack brands and under-estimated for the discount, large-pack brands. This suggests (subject to the accuracy of the calculated marginal costs in the second column) that the model will under-estimate the market power associated with large brand cigarettes and over-estimate the market power associated with the newer discount brands. However, the model also predicts considerable variation across the six cities, with it predicting much lower marginal costs in the largest market of Sydney and much higher marginal costs in the smallest market of Hobart-Launceston. While two brands in this table feature negative marginal costs, only four brands across all six states have negative marginal costs.
We estimate two sets of markups using the two sets of marginal costs, as reported in Table 8 .
The rst column reports the markups estimated using the marginal costs calculated outside the demand estimation, and remaining columns report the markups calculated using the marginal costs predicted using the demand model and Bertrand-Nash assumption. The median markups from the demand model in the second column are about 10% less than the calculated ones reported in the rst column but the variation is considerable with much larger markups predicted for Sydney and lower markups (for the most part) for Hobart-Launceston. The calculated markups, in the rst column are 1% higher for the discount brands than the premium brands. The predicted markups in the second column yield even greater variation for this. The lack of variation in the rst column could just reect that we are not observing transaction prices. But it also reects that we are typically estimating much lower elasticities of demand for the discount brands. Note, that when we estimate the model using a smaller market denition, the greater elasticities of demand translate into slightly higher marginal costs and slightly smaller markups.
The pattern of markups across discount and mainstream brands in Prentice (2010) observed the same pattern of markups across the discount and mainstream brands as in this paper, though with lower elasticities these tended to be greater.
Merger and divestiture
In this section we apply our model to simulate the eects on prices of the merger that was prevented in 1999 and of the partial divestiture approved by the ACCC. The problem for the antitrust authority faced with a merger like that between Rothmans and Wills is how to construct a divestiture that avoids substantial increases in market power. In the absence of synergies, theory suggests that products that are close substitutes should remain in seperate hands and that the larger the product the more important it is to not leave it in hands that would reduce competition. It is likely that the ACCC will have a good idea of the relative importance of the major brands. But without data on their substitutability, theory cannot provide any further guidance. This problem is even more acute if there are a large number of brands. The merger simulation model has the potential to provide more information on counterfactuals. We then compare the simulated changes in prices resulting from the merger and divestiture with the actual changes in prices between 1998 and 2000.
Changes between 1992 and 1999 and implications for the simulations
Between 1992 and 1998 there are no major changes to the structure of the Australian cigarette market. Only one small brand exits and one new brand is introduced.
16 Clarke and Prentice (2012) demonstrate that after the prohibition of print advertising from late 1990 and on sponsorship, billboard and cinema advertising by 1995 cigarette companies largely ceased introducing new products and market shares became extremely stable suggesting a very stable market. However, between 1992 and 2000 there are large changes in taxes that would have substantially aected marginal cost. These changes are likely to be much larger than any other possible unobserved change in marginal costs.
The rst major set of changes were increases in state taxes and the commonwealth excise as reported in Table 1 . At the end of 1997, these taxes were replaced with an equivalent ad-valorem surcharge on the commonwealth excise because of a High Court decision holding that the state retail taxes were unconstitutional. 17 As excise is charged on the (unobserved) tobacco weight of the cigarette, we do not observe the excise paid by brand. Even if there are no other changes in marginal cost between 1992 and 1998 (and Figure 1 suggest that changes in inputs would have to be extremely large to alter the general pattern resulting from tax changes) we cannot simply adjust the 1992 marginal costs to get estimates for 1998. Instead, to focus on the eect of the merger and divestiture we assume that marginal costs remained at their 1992 levels.
Secondly, between 1998 and 2000 there were further changes to the taxation of cigarettes as part of a general tax reform. In November 1999, the excise and surcharge were replaced with a per-stick tax of $0.18872 (Costello, 2000) . The reason for this change was because it was recognised that a weight charge encouraged manufacturers to make larger numbers of lighter sticks. BATA stated that the eect of this change was that prices rose by 10% to 30% depending on pack size (BATA, 2000) . In addition, in July 2000, a 10% GST on most goods, including cigarettes, was introduced replacing a set of wholesale taxes. While in theory the change in the legal incidence may have been less than 10% due to eliminating wholesale taxes, the GST compliance statements of BATA and ITA stated that these credits were very small (BATA, 2000; ITA, no date). 18 To deal with the changes in taxes between 1998 and 2000 we compare the predicted growth rate of prices with the dierence, by brand, between the actual growth rate of prices between 1998 and 2000 and the average growth rate of prices across brands of the same size within each market. This is because the tax changes in general will have had similar eects on same-sized brands. However, note if there are common changes, by pack size, as a result of the merger and divestiture then these will also be dierenced out as well.
An additional complication is that due to public concern that rms would take advantage of the tax changes to exert market power, the ACCC was required to extensively monitor all companies pricing during this period (ACCC, July 1999). If the merger created incentives to raise prices, rms (primarily BATA) may have been reluctant to do so under this scrutiny. This would be of less concern for rms that prefered to cut prices (primarily ITA) in response to the merger though.
Hence, it is possible that we may see more evidence of price cuts than price increases following the merger during this period.
Finally, there may have unobserved changes in demand over this period. To some extent we control for this by including a time trend but as already noted the stable oerings of the rms suggest that the demand side of the market was relatively stable after 1992.
Simulation and Comparison
In this section we report the simulations of the merger and the divestiture. If an estimated model could predict the exact percentage changes following a divestiture then it would be considered extremely successful and would most likely have been a reliable tool for a more detailed management of the divestiture. However, even if the model does not predict the exact percentage changes but correctly identies the direction and relative size of a sucient number of eects then it is capable of providing useful information for the ACCC and should be considered partially successful. However, if the model just gets one or two obvious cases correct and a few others, this would not be considered particularly successful. The ACCC would have no idea ahead of time which predictions were likely to be correct and which ones were not going to be correct. In this case, the ACCC would do just as well relying on intuition from theory and the available data on market shares.
Merger
We examine the model's predictions on what might have occurred if the merger had been permitted to go through without a divestiture. The details of how we construct the sample for simulation are contained in Appendix A.2. The rst column on Table 9 reports the predicted changes for the largest brands after the merger. This reveals two striking results. First, that removing competition between the largest brands leads to substantial price increases. Reducing competition between the most popular brands for the pack sizes of 25 and 50 suggests that prices would have risen substantially typically between 40% and 100%. The second striking result is that these substantial price increases have little eect on the prices of the brands oered by Philip Morris, with typically around a 1% change. This could reect that most of Philip Morris's brands were relatively small and that the larger brands are suciently dierent and therefore would be less sensitive to changes in the prices of other brands. Crooke et al (1999) highlights that the choice of demand function implies a certain curvature of the demand curve which has implications for the simulations of the merger and divestiture. The large change in prices may result from a functional form that may not have been estimated if we had data over that range.
The rst two columns of Table 10 summarises the results for all brands, by pack size, that would have been sold by BATA and Philip Morris after the merger, and the results are broadly similar to those for the largest brands. The largest change is for the 50 stick brands which do not compete directly with Philip Morris brands.
Divestiture
We examine the model's predictions of the eect on prices of a divestiture and compare these eects to actual price changes. We begin by focussing on the predictions for the largest brands and then consider the brands by pack-size. The results for the largest brands are summarized in Table 9 . The second and third columns report the median (across the six cities) actual changes and the median dierence from the mean across the cities for each brand. Between 1998 and 2000
there was a common substantial increase in prices of between 13% and 33% with the larger pack size brands featuring a bigger increase as was intended by by the government when it changed the excise.
Predicted changes are set out in the fourth column. First, comparing the results to those for the merger without divestiture (in the rst column), in general the predicted price increases for the brands retained by BATA are about one half. However, many of the price increases are disporportionately larger than those observed in practice. For Philip Morris, the predicted relative changes are very close to the observed changes, whereas for the one ITA brand, although the direction of the change is correct, the size is much too large.
The model does a generally good job of predicting the signs of the changes. For the discount brands, the signs were all correct and the model correctly predicts that after the merger, ITA's Finally, we analyse how general these patterns are, using the results reported in Table 10 .
First considering Philip Morris, in the fourth and fth columns, the actual changes are broadly similar to the predicted changes in that large changes were not predicted. Next we consider the brands that went to ITA (in the eighth, ninth, twelfth and thirteenth columns). In general, for all groups except for 35's originally from Wills, the model predicts that there will be small price increases or substantial price cuts. For the brands that came from Wills the model predicts large changes, whereas for the brands that came from Rothmans, much smaller changes were predicted.
Except for the large brand, Horizon, the model does not have much success predicting the sign and size of the former Wills brands. However, for the former Rothmans brands, the ranking of the price changes for the two brands is correct and the size of the eects are not far o. Finally we consider the brands that went to BATA (in the sixth, seventh, tenth and eleventh columns).
The model predicts, as for the monopoly case that there would be large price increases. Indeed, much larger increases in prices than actually happened. However, the relative increases across the two rms were about right. The model predicted that there would be greater price increases for the former Rothmans brands and, comparing the sixth and tenth columns, this is what occurred.
It also predicted larger increases for the discount brands compared with the mainstream brands and this occurred for both the former Wills brands and for the 35's and 50's former Rothmans brands. However, the model predicted the lowest increase would be for the former 20 stick brands of Rothmans but these brands featured the third largest average actual growth rate amongst the former Rothmans brands that went to BATA.
The general conclusion for simulating the divesture is that our model is partially successful. It does not do a good job (in general) of predicting the sizes of the changes in prices that followed the divestiture. In general it predicted much too large changes for the BATA brands. On the other hand it doesn't just pick up the odd correct pattern much of the pattern of price changes is largely picked up in the simulations so it provides information that would have been useful for the ACCC in managing the divestiture.
Finally, we compare our results to those of Pham and Prentice (2010) and Friberg and Romahn (2012) . The pattern of predictions at the company level in Pham and Prentice (2010) are fairly similar in that the largest changes were predicted for BATA and that Philip Morris and ITA would experience smaller changes or even price cuts. It is not straightforward to compare at the brand level because of the dierent levels of aggregation in estimation and reporting. Friberg and Romahn (2012) consider the Swedish beer market which is quite dierent to the Australian cigarette market.
However, an interesting similarity in their predictions and outcomes is that companies not involved in the merger do not feature large price changes. Their assessment of the prediction performance is at a much higher level of aggregation than ours and they tend to nd price cuts following the divestitures which matches what happened to the divested brands but not the retained brands.
They had data much closer to the merger date (and did not have large tax increases at the same time) which suggests they should have a better chance of obtaining more successful forecasts but we don't have enough information to make a detailed comparison.
Conclusion
The research question this paper seeks to address is whether structural econometric models can inform counterfactual scenario analysis by antitrust authorities faced with a potentially anticompetitive merger. We estimate a random coecients logit model of demand for cigarettes using new data constructed from industry documents and various external sources. The random coecients logit produces demand elasticities consistent with the pattern of price sensitivity described in internal marketing documents of Philip Morris Australia.
We then simulate two counterfactual scenarios a merger between two of the three largest cigarette companies in Australia, Wills and Rothman, and a merger involving a partial divestiture to an entrant, ITA. The results of our merger simulation suggest that the merger would have led to large price increases on brands sold by BATA. The results from our divestiture predict substantial price increases by the BATA brands, even with the competition from ITA. We then compare the simulation's predictions with the actual pattern of price changes following the divestiture. We did not observe large increases in the price of the BATA brands relative to those of Philip Morris and ITA. However, the model was able to successfully predict the directions of price movements. In addition, the model successfully predicts that there would be little reaction from Philip Morris from the merger, and relatively small reactions from the ITA brands.
These results are signicant in that they provide key insight into the general direction of price movements post merger and on the pattern of substitutability and direction of changes in the post-divestiture equilibrium that would not have been immediately apparent before the divestiture.
More generally, they provide an example of how a random coecients logit model can provide useful information in advance of a divestiture under more demanding conditions than the only other study considering this question (Friberg and Romahn, 2012) . The combination of tax changes and the high level of regulation prevented us from being able to predict exact price changes. In addition, we also provide new information on the extent of market power in the cigarette industry in addition the sole other brand-level study by Ciliberto and Kumino (2010) . We would recommend further research into the applicability of the random coecients model to assessing price eects of a merger in industries which are unencumbered by the intense regulation of the cigarette industry. 1. Pham and Prentice (2010) assess the performance of a nested logit model in simulating the same divestiture we consider. Jayaratne and Shapiro (2000) and Tenn and Yun (2011) also empirically analyse divestitures.
2. See Bardsley and Olekans (1999) . For a detailed account of the evolution of the Australian cigarette market up to the early 1980s see Walker (1984) and for developments since then see Scollo and Winstanley (2008) . For developments in the U.S. see Brandt (2007) .
3. The PSA's activities were subsumed in 1995 by the Trade Practices Commission and then, in 1996, the ACCC.
4. There have been no empirical analyses of the eect of the PSA on market power by rms so their eect on behaviour has not been established. This does not aect our estimation since our demand model does not require any assumption about the nature of competition. Furthermore, the cigarette industry was no longer monitored by the PSA when the merger took place. But, the PSA was monitoring in the period when we estimate marginal costs, which does require an assumption about competition, and hence our estimates during this period are subject to this caveat. 8. Hendel (1999) requires individual data as well as aggregate data to estimate a model of both brand choice and quantity choice.
9. See Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) for a recent survey.
10. We have adapted BLP's program for estimation and subsequent simulations.
11. The model of Ciliberto and Kumino (2010) features rms accounting for the stock of addicted consumers resulting in lower equilibrium prices. As we demonstrate in section 5.3, our results are not consistent with this.
12. Data for Hobart includes the second largest city in Tasmania, Launceston. Appendix A lists full references for internal industry documents used in collection of market share data and discusses some issues about the data.
13. The July edition is used for 1987 as the June edition is unavailable.
14. As described in Winstanley et al (1995) , smokeless tobacco products never had a sizeable market in Australia and were progressively banned by the states and federally from the mid-1980s.
Survey evidence in Hill and White (1995) is that less than 2% of people smoke cigars or pipes and less than 8% of people smoke roll-your-own cigarettes. PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2005) Second, in a few cases (mainly brands with very small market shares) the variety for the market share includes several varieties with dierent prices. In this case, we use the median price. In an even fewer number of cases the market share is for a set of varieties in dierent pack sizes. In each case we assigned the largest pack size. To make these comparable, we calculate the price per cigarette stick.
A.2 Additional details on the construction of the sample for simulation Euromonitor, demonstrates that neither of the new brands were in the top 11 brands for that year (the smallest of which had a market share of 0.33%), therefore, meaning that they must have been two of a large number of brands supplying the remaining 10-15% of the national market.
Besides new brands, between 1992 and 2000 there were eighteen new pack sizes introduced for twelve brands. For ten of the eighteen, the new pack sizes were just ve cigarettes more or less than the pack size existing in 1992. For the remaining eight, the new pack sizes were either ten cigarettes more or less or between twenty and thirty cigarettes less. In all of these cases we used the 1992 marginal cost for the nearest pack size from the same brand.
A.3 Sources
Market share data was obtained from the following internal documents which are downloadable from the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library: Marginal cost from external reports are estimated from the wholesale price charged by each rm as reported in the Australian Retail Tobacconist. We calculate the marginal cost of a cigarette sold to the consumer as the sum of three components. The rst component is the state retail taxes, which we observe. The other two components are the federal excise tax and the manufacturer's direct costs of production. We do not observe the latter components but in Figure 7 .1 of the PSA (1994), included as Figure One , a diagram shows the average percentage of raw materials, direct labour, indirect costs, excise and margin of a wholesale price. Excise is reported on average to be 53% of the wholesale price. Direct labour and raw materials account for approximately 15% of the wholesale price. We apply these percentages to all wholesale prices to estimate the excise and direct costs for all cigarettes.M C j,s = 0.678 * P wholesale,j,s + t s P base,j,s
There are likely to be systematic dierences between these estimates and the estimates from the model for two reasons. First, if dierent rms have dierent costs, there will be systematic dierences across rms in that, for example, the costs for a low cost suggested by the model will be smaller than the average estimates. Secondly, the model may imply lower costs for all rms than the average cost if the market is more competitive than the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Market shares are shares of cigarettes sold in each market.
Source: AC Nielsen reports as described in Section 4.1 and listed in Appendix A. Note: The dataset has 1591 observations. All statistics for data in sample unless otherwise indicated.
Real prices compiled using city CPI with a base year of 1989/1990.
Standard deviations in parentheses.
2. Statistics for all brands and varieties available for sale as reported in the Australian Retail Tobacconist.
3. Average market share across cities. Signicance: 1%***, 5%**, 10%*.
All specications include brand and city dummies. Test of overall Signicance 54.70*** ***: 1%, **: 5%, *:10%. All tests two-sided except for price.
Brand dummies not reported. Median own and cross price elasticities across six cities for eight largest brands in 1992. Predicted marginal costs are predicted applying the estimated random coecients logit model assuming a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Calculated markups use actual prices and calculated marginal costs as described in section 5.3 and Appendix B.
Predicted markups use the the actual prices and predicted marginal costs as in Table 7 .
Margins for Brisbane are 10% greater. All statistics are the median across the six cities. Merger refers to merger without divestiture. Divestiture refers to merger followed by divestiture Dierence to the mean is the dierence between the actual growth for that brand less the mean growth rate for that pack size. Actual price change calculated as dierence between mean growth for brands held by company and mean growth for all brands at that pack size. Predicted price change is the median aross all observations across cities by size and combination of company before and after. 
